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This paper provides a concise overview of the state of the art on monetary policy and 
central banking from a public choice perspective. It starts with a brief look at the roots of 
today’s view of monetary policy conduct and the design of pertinent institutions in early 
work on political business cycles, and then proceeds to a discussion of the inflation-
stabilization dilemma along with proposed solutions in the form of central bank 
independence and conservativeness, incentive contracts, and inflation policy targets. The last 
section addresses current developments. These include the proper choice of monetary 
policy targets, the role of New Keynesian and sticky-information aggregate-supply curves and 
the quest for simple and efficient rules for monetary policy that has been triggered by the 
proposal and widespread polularity of the Taylor rule. 
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1 This survey puts particular emphasis on recent, policy related developments. Older
developments are only selectively discussed in order to bring out the public choice roots of
many  current  developments  and  provide  a  theoretical  background  for  contemporary
discussions. For more detail on these earlier developments, readers may consult two previous
surveys of mine which focus on political business cycles and the first generation discussion
of  time inconsistency  (Gärtner,  1994),  and  the  second generation  discussion  of  time 
inconsistency  including  a  refined  macroeconomic  framework  with  persistence  and  the
interaction with fiscal policy (Gärtner, 2000).
1. Introduction
There are few areas in which public choice had as much success in making inroads into
mainstream economics and, in particular, in influencing real world developments as in the
design of monetary policy institutions and the day to day conduct of monetary policy. This
survey tracks these developments, from the humble beginnings in the 1970s related to
Nordhaus‘ (1975) and MacRae‘s (1977) accounts of the opportunistic political business cycle
to the widespread academic and political discussion on monetary policy rules and targets of
recent years.
1 Section 2 contains a compact review of the two classical, pathbreaking ideas
in political macroeconomics, the political business cycle and the inflation bias. Section 3
advances to more modern, stochastic models in which central banks are not only expected to
ensure the stability of prices, but also to cushion the economy from the employment and
income effects of supply shocks. Society‘s desire for an undistorted stabilization of shocks
calls for refined remedies to the time inconsistency problem, such as performance contracts
and inflation targets for central banks. Section 4 moves on to a discussion of current
developments which focus on merits of instrument and targeting rules for monetary policy
and their efficiency. Section 5 concludes by assessing these developments from a public
choice perspective.
2. How it started: political business cycles and all that
The contemporary academic discussion and recent developments in monetary policy and
institutions rest on three main pillars: The traditional theory of economic policy in the spirit
of  Theil  (1961)  and  Tinbergen  (1952);  the  endogenisation  of  economic  policy,  the
groundwork for which was laid in many classical writings in public choice, but which main
influence stems from the compact and compelling formalisations by Nordhaus (1975) and
MacRae (1977); and, the rules versus discretion debate that came in the wake of the rational
expectations revolution, with implications for endogenous policy making that were initially  4  
2 We do not make a distinction between a Phillips curve and an aggregate supply
curve. To simplify notation, we usually normalize the log of potential income, y*, to zero and
give the aggregate supply curve unity slope. 
formalized by Kydland and Prescott (1977) but worked out and popularized by Barro and
Gordon (1983). We will focus here on the public choice related roots of modern monetary
policy conduct and design.
The birth of New Political Macroeconomics, as it would be called decades later, and,
hence,  also  of  positive  analyses  of  monetary  policy,  was  Nordhaus‘  concise  formal
demonstration of what opportunistic governments might do to an economy. In strong contrast
to  Theil Tinbergen type  benevolent  policymakers,  opportunism  takes  the  form  of  vote
maximization at periodically held elections. Voters derive instantaneous or period utility from
the state of the economy, as represented by inflation π and the logarithm of income y (or,
alternatively, unemployment):
(1) u ' &0.5π2 % ξy
Votes cast on election day then reflect total utility and, hence, the course of the economy
during the incumbent government‘s recent term in office, with more distant periods receiving
less weight due to voter forgetfulness.
Operating within a natural rate aggregate supply framework in which income (or,
again,  unemployment) depend on inflation surprises,
2
(2) y ' π & E&1π
and inflation expectations are adaptive, governments maximize reelection prospects by
resorting to expansionary policies, fiscal or monetary, in the run up to an election, while
deliberately driving the economy into a recession once the election is over, thus creating
election related swings in economic activity known as the political business cycle.
From the perspective of mainstream macroeconomics, the Nordhaus model (and its
cousin, the partisan theory proposed by Hibbs (1977), which suggested that election related
swings were due to ideologically motivated differences between the preferences of party
constituencies) was almost dead on arrival. Despite the extraordinary interest it drew from  5  
3 See, for example, Frey and Ramser (1976) and McCallum (1977).
4 This, by any means, should not be read to mean that political business cycles are
dead. See for example the contribution by Drazen (2000b).
5 The inferiority of this result obtained under discretion is usually demonstrated by
comparing it with the optimal inflation rate π = 0 that obtains when the central bank has to
commit to an inflation rate before expectations are being formed.
public  choice  scholars,  its  key  building  blocks  were  at  that  time  being  discarded  by
macroeconomists: a non vertical long run Phillips curve (which was not essential to the
political business cycle, however), adaptive inflation expectations, and backward looking
voters. A number of authors
3 quickly pointed out that little in terms of added rationality in
inflation expectations formation was required in order to eliminate the political business
cycle.
While efforts by Alesina (1987), Persson and Tabellini (1990) and others gave the
study of election related macroeconomic cycles a vigorous second life under the labels of
Rational partisan theory and Rational political business cycles, political business cycles do
not feature prominently on today‘s research agenda any longer.
4
Instead, research interest has shifted towards the rational expectations equilibrium
implications of endogenous policy making, with a particular emphasis on monetary policy.
The starting point for this work, overlooked by most early critics, is the insight that while
rational inflation expectations do indeed eliminate the political business cycle, they do leave
the economy  and policy trapped in a suboptimal, inefficient equilibrium. If monetary policy
is driven by preferences such as (1), either because it caters to the electorate, or because this
describes  the  government‘s  or  the  central  bank‘s  very  own  preferences,  the  model‘s
discretionary rational expectations solution in the context of a one shot game between the
government and the economy is
(3) π ' ξ
Thus, despite the desire for full price stability inherent in (1), monetary policy with
discretionary leeway cannot deliver.
5 The reason is the time inconsistency of price stability.
Once it is achieved achieved with income being at its potential level, the central bank can
always raise its own utility, or public support, by generating some inflation and substantial  6  
6 See Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998).
7 See Alesina and Summers (1993).
8 See, however, Forder‘s (1998a, 1998b) illuminating and sobering account of the
validity of empirical evidence on central bank independence and inflation. Hayo (1998) and
Hayo and Hefeker (2002) point to potential problems resulting from the endogeneity of
central bank independence.
income gains. While this mechanism and insight had already been described by Kydland and
Prescott (1977), it attracted little attention until it was restated and popularized by Barro and
Gordon (1983). The latter work triggered a still ongoing discussion of what institutional
arrangements would lead to the best macroeconomic outcomes, in particular, a reduction of
the inflation bias. Initially, Barro and Gordon (1983) had suggested that reputational forces
may take care of the inflation bias. However because such forces are strongly weakened when
the government‘s horizon does not extend to infinity, Rogoff‘s (1985) suggestion to put
monetary policy into the hands of a conservative central bank, characterized by total oblevity
towards income developments, received the most attention. In the above context, an arch
conservative monetary policy guided by preferences   delivers full price stability ˆ ξ ' 0
without any detrimental effects on income. To achieve such policy, the governing body of the
central bank must have preferences  , and the central bank needs to be made completely ˆ ξ ' 0
independent  of  the  government  (which  political  competition  forces  to  attend  to  the
preferences of voters represented by  ).
6 Condoned by the apparent empirical support for this ξ
proposition in the form of significant negative correlations between long run inflation and
measures of central bank independence
7, the long ruling orthodoxy was that central banks
must be completely independent and as conservative (meaning inflation averse) as possible.
8
3. Enter the stabilization bias
Two innovations rekindled interest in the basic Nordhaus scenario and kept the discussion
alive and vigorous up to the present:
The first was a modification of the utility function that gave inflation and income
symmetric treatment. Nordhaus (1975), Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon
(1983), and virtually hundreds of papers since, had employed an asymmetric functional form,
assuming  that  utility  depended  nonlinearly  on  inflation,  but  linearly  on  income  (or
unemployment). This did help simplify the math, yet still sufficed to derive the political  7  
9 The drawback is that only the marginal utility of price stability declines as we
approach the target. The marginal utility of income never declines since the income target
implied by (1) is infinitely large.
business cycle under adaptive inflation expectations and the inflation bias when expectations
were rational.
9
The second innovation was to conduct the analysis in a more realistic stochastic
context in which the economy was subject to supply shocks. Thus the potential need for
stabilization entered the picture.
3.1. The trade-off between price stability and shock stabilization
In order to demonstrate the implications of these two innovations, let us proceed from a
hybrid utility function that comprises both the original asymmetric treatment (for α = 0) and
the later double quadratic symmetric treatment (for α = 1):
(3) u ' &0.5π2 & 0.5αξ(y & k)2 % (1&α)ξy
k > 0 is society‘s income target which is assumed to exceed potential income (which has been
normalized  to  zero)  because  the  latter  is  inefficiently  low  (also  carrying  involuntary
unemployment) due to distortive taxes, monopolistic trade unions, legal constraints, and other
imperfections in goods and labour markets.
Aggregate supply is subject to surprise inflation plus supply shocks g that are white
noise with zero mean and variance  : σ
2
g
(4) y ' π & E&1π % g
Maximizing equation (3) subject to (4) yields the following rational expectations
solutions for inflation and income:
(5) π ' (1&α)ξ % αξ k & αξ
1% αξ
g
(6) y ' 1
1% αξ
g  8  
10 This is because the aggregate supply curve has been give a slope of one. In the
general case, the slope coefficient would also feature in the stabilization terms.
11 For a result to be classified as first best, income also would have to be as required.
Since this is considered to be beyond the reach of monetary policy, the optimality of
monetary policy is only judged by whether it achieves second best results.
Equations (5) and (6) convey three important insights:
1. The first two terms on the right hand side of (5) constitute the inflation bias that
monetary policy cannot get rid of, even in the absence of shocks. If utility is linear in y (α =
0) this bias equals ξ.  If utility is nonlinear in y (α = 1), with decreasing marginal utility of
income, this bias amounts to  . It is positive if k exceeds potential income. Then the ξk
marginal utility of income is positive at the no surprise equilibrium level, and inflation must
be  positive  in  order  to  generate  a  marginal  disutility  of  inflation  large  enough  to
counterbalance the net temptation to raise income. At  full price stability, this does not apply
because the marginal disutility of inflation is zero.
2. The coefficients in the stochastic terms of both (5) and (6) indicate how supply
shocks are split into inflation and income responses. Note that the absolute values of the two
coefficients sum up to one.
10 So only 1/(1 + αξ) percent of any given adverse supply shock
are actually permitted to drive income down, while the remaining αξ/(1 + αξ) percent
materialize in increased inflation.
3. When utility is linear in y (α = 0) and thus the marginal utility of income is
constant, the solutions simplify to   and  . Inflation is always constant at a level π ' ξ y ' g
reflecting the conservativeness of monetary policy. Supply shocks are never permitted to
affect inflation, independently of the conservativeness of monetary policy.
The third insight states the specific conditions under which the famous monetary 
policy conservativeness result holds: In order to achieve second best outcomes, that is, full
price stability and the exact extent of shock stabilization society requests, monetary policy
needs to be as conservative as possible in the sense that it should only look at the goal of price
stability while ignoring movements of income altogether.
11
If, however, more realistically, the utility function is symmetric (α  = 1), a dilemma
pops up. To see this, note that the solutions for inflation and income now become
(7) π ' ξk & ξ
1%ξ
g  9  
12 The characterization of central banks as conservative when their weight coefficient ˆ ξ
is low is the traditional definition. A double quadratic utility function with an income target
k that exceeds potential output permits a second definition: Central banks that feature a low
income target k are called goal conservative, which leaves those with a low weight coefficient
being called weight conservative. See Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger (2001).
(8) y ' 1
1%ξ
g
The key insight here is that in a stochastic context with decreasing marginal utility
both from more price stability and from income gains, the delegation of monetary policy to
an arch conservative central bank (characterized by  ) constitutes a fourth best solution ˆ ξ ' 0
only. All it ensures is that we achieve price stability. The price to be paid are heavily distorted
responses to supply shocks. The variance of inflation is minimized at  , var(π) ' 0@σ
2
g ' 0
but this goes at the cost of maximum variance of income at  . Society would opt var(y) ' σ
2
g
for an intermediate solution, namely




. (8a) var(y) ' [1/(1%ξ)]2σ
2
g
In the face of this trade off between inflation bias and stabilization bias, a superior
outcome, a third best result, is achieved if society picks a more moderately conservative
central  bank,  one  that  is  more  conservative  than  society,  but  not  arch  conservative
( ) [Rogoff (1985)].
12 ξ > ˆ ξ > 0
Figure 1 may help clarify the involved trade offs and serve as a background for issues
addressed later on. The convex line constitutes the macroeconomic trade off between income
variability and inflation variability obtained by combining the results generated by different
central banks that only differ with respect to the weight parameter  in their double quadratic ˆ ξ
utility function. Points A and B on the axes mark the extreme cases of an arch conservative
central bank (characterized by  ) that only cares about price stability, and a socialist one ˆ ξ ' 0
(characterized by  ) that is concerned with income only, respectively. Generally, the ˆ ξ 6 4
resulting variances of inflation and income depend on  as given in (7a) and (8a). Upon ˆ ξ  10  








noting that the two coefficients add up to 1, we can derive the macroeconomic trade off 
  var(y) ' σ
2
g & 2σgvar(π)0.5 % var(π)
whose first and second derivatives make it convex to the origin. Also, the graph‘s axes are
tangent to this trade off curve at points A and B since the slope approaches !4 when var(π)





The negatively sloped straight lines are indifference curves that indicate what society
wants. Lines are derived by taking expectations of society‘s double quadratic utility function,
, which can be modified to yield Eu ' &0.5Eπ2 & ξE(y & k)2
. var(y) ' &2
ξ
Eu % k 2 & 1
ξ
var(π)
Socially optimal stabilization of shocks is achieved in point C, which requires the
central bank to have the same preferences as society. The constraint‘s segment between C and  11  
14  Current  research  on  monetary  policy  rules  employs  a  narrower  definition  of
efficiency that assumes that the inflation bias can be removed independently [see Ball (1999)
or Williams (2003)]. We will discuss this below.
15 The discussion on performance contracts was initiated by Persson and Tabellini
(1993), Waller (1995) and Walsh (1995). Major contributors to the early academic discussion
of inflation targets in the current context were Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), Muscatelli
(1995) and Svensson (1997a). See also Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), and Walsh (2003),
chapter 8.
B is not efficient because both shock stabilization becomes more biased and the inflation bias
increases as we move away from C. The segment between A and C is efficient, however,
since we cannot achieve superior shock stabilization without raising the inflation bias, and
vice versa.
14 Starting from A, raising  improves utility by making the stabilization of shocks ˆ ξ
more in line with what people want. But it depresses utility by raising the inflation bias. The
optimum obtains in a point such as D, where these two effects exactly balance and society‘s
net marginal benefit from increasing   is zero. ˆ ξ
The 1990s brought an avalanche of research on how to move beyond the third best
outcome, represented by point D, that a moderately conservative central bank may generate.
This quest for second best outcomes in a stochastic macroeconomic framework focussed on
two main suggestions: To equip central bank chiefs with a performance contract, or to
commit them to an inflation target.
15
3.2. Performance contracts
Equipped with a linear performance contract of the form  , where s is a variable s ' & λπ
component of the central bank‘s governing body‘s salary that depends on inflation, the central
bank‘s derived utility function changes into
(9) u ' &0.5π2 & 0.5ˆ ξ(y & k)2 & λπ
Now optimal policy under discretion leads to the following behaviour of inflation and
income:
(10) π ' ˆ ξk & λ &
ˆ ξ
1%ˆ ξ
g  12  
16 A linear contract focussing on the performance of aggregate income could be
tailored to achieve the same second best result, of course. The literature emphasizes inflation
performance contracts, however.
(11) y ' 1
1%ˆ ξ
g
These results show that a properly designed linear performance contract can indeed
lead to second best results. The inflation bias, comprising the first two terms on the right hand
side of (10), is removed if  . And biased shock stabilization is prevented when the λ ' ˆ ξπ
central bank‘s preferences are representative of society‘s ( ). This actually is ensured ˆ ξ ' ξ
best if the central bank is not independent of the government. Whatever tendencies towards
a higher inflation bias this may carry can easily be taken care of by setting the punishment
coefficient in the performance contract appropriately.
16
3.3. Inflation targets
Inflation targets have been very popular in academic research as a probably more realistic and
viable alternative to performance contracts. Inflation targets also do provide a natural link
from the literature discussed here to the recent intensive discussion of general monetary
policy rules and targets at which we will look below. The general idea is that society (via the
government) can communicate an inflation target   to the central bank. The questions to be πT
answered are, what this target should be, how target misses are to be punished, and what
preferences the central bank should have.
After adding the inflation target term to the central bank‘s utility function, the derived
utility function reads
(12) u ' &0.5π2 & 0.5ˆ ξ(y & k)2 & 0.5λ(π& πT)2
Under discretion, the inflation rate follows
(13) π ' 1
1% λ




1% λ% ˆ ξ
g
while income is determined by  13  
17 Svensson (1997a) proposes that the central bank can simply be assigned a utility
function which completely overrides any generic preferences which the central bank actually
has. This formally solves the problem of a negative inflation target which is never met, but
is arbitrary and unconvincing, not only from a public choice perspective.
18 The most prominent example is probably the European Central Bank which operates
in a legal framework that does not seem to take account of the trade offs and refined results
emerging in a stochastic macroeconomic context.
(14) y ' 1% λ
1% λ% ˆ ξ
g
Again, a second best optimum can be achieved. The condition for the inflation bias
to disappear is  . This is an awkward result, however. Not only because the πT ' &ˆ ξk/λ
central bank must be told to deflate, but even more so because the central bank systematically
misses the assigned target. In the aspired zero inflation equilibrium, the deviation from the
inflation target must be large enough to offset any temptation to inflate that results from the
central bank‘s own preferences.
17
The condition for avoiding a stabilization bias is that the shock‘s coefficient in, say,
(14), which describes the central bank‘s response, must be the same as the shock‘s coefficient
in (8), which states society‘s desired response. This is accomplished if  , meaning ˆ ξ ' (1% λ)ξ
that now the government must pick a central banker who is less conservative, less inflation 
averse than society!
Table 1 summarizes the consolidated knowledge about central bank independence and
conservativeness in this section‘s macroeconomic environment. The important point it does
highlight is that little scientific support remains for the quest for the most independent, most
conservative central bank that did and still does seem to shape the design and development
of institutions in many of the world‘s countries and regions.
18
3.4. A macroeconomic framework with income persistence
The above findings do not change dramatically if, more in line with our empirical knowledge
about the time series properties of income and other macroeconomic variables, we let shocks
have lasting effects on income due to some degree of persistence, as in equation (15).  14  
19 For details, see Svensson (1997a).
Table 1.  How conservative should the central bank be?
Macroeconomic and monetary policy framework Optimal degree of central bank conservatism
# Deterministic macroeconomic framework
        Baseline model (full discretion)   arch conservative  (   ) ˆ ξ ' 0
# Stochastic macroeconomic framework
        Baseline model (full discretion), 3
rd best
        Added performance contract; 2
nd best
        Added inflation target; 2
nd best
  moderately conservative  (   ) ξ > ˆ ξ > 0
  as conservative as society  (   ) ˆ ξ ' ξ
  less conservative than society  (   ) ˆ ξ > ξ
(15) y ' βy&1% π & E&1π % g
Because inflation surprises and shocks now affect all future incomes, policy choices
are being made so as to maximize the expected present value   of current and future Et&1Ut
period utilities:




Under discretion, there is still an inflation bias, which now takes the form
(17) π ' ξk
1& (α%b)δ
& cy&1 & dg
b, c and d are coefficients composed of the structural equations parameters that we do
not need to spell out here.
19 This bias features a constant part which is similar to the bias in
the natural rate framework discussed above. In addition to the familiar dependence on
preferences ξ this bias also depends on the degree of persistence β. The straightforward
explanation is that the more persistent income is, the longer income gains last that are
triggered by current inflation surprises. But then the temptation to inflate is larger, and
because this is anticipated by the labour market, we end up with a higher inflation bias.
The second term defining the inflation bias is endogenous, time dependent. It states  15  
that this inflation bias is the higher, the lower income was last period. The mechanism at play
here is that the marginal utility of income is higher when an adverse supply shock hit income
last period and persistence will thus tend to keep income below potential income this period
also. The central bank will thus be prepared to inject a larger inflation hike into the economy
in the hope of income gains. But since again the labour market anticipates this, these income
gains do not really accrue, and all we are left with is an inflation bias above average.
3.4.1. State-dependent performance contracts
While the math to demonstrate this is labourious, it is intuitively clear that a linear inflation
performance contract cannot do away with this type of variable inflation bias. The required
extension of the optimal contract is straightforward, though. Since the inflation bias is
variable, dependent on last period‘s income, the performance contract must also be state 
dependent of the form
(18) st ' &(λ1& λ2 yt&1)πt
This contract may specify  so as to eliminate the constant part of the inflation bias, λ 1
as  in  the  natural rate  framework  discussed  above.  And  it  may  specify    such  as  to λ 2
counterbalance the added incentive to inflate after income fell, thus removing the state 
dependent part of the inflation bias. Once the performance contract is designed optimally,
central bank preferences should be identical to society‘s in order not to bias stabilization. This
mimics the result obtained in the natural rate context.
3.4.2. A state-dependent inflation target
In the presence of income persistence, inflation targets must be path dependent, comprising
a constant term to take care of the fixed inflation bias and a term that follows lagged income
to take care of the variable inflation bias:  . As Svensson (1997a) shows, π
T
t ' β0% β1yt&1
however, even a state dependent inflation target cannot get rid of both types of inflation bias,
and keep stabilization undistorted. It must be combined with the appropriate central bank
preferences that compensate for the stabilization bias introduced by the inflation target.  16  
20 Another candidate that has entered the discussion is the sticky information Phillips
curve proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), which seems to have some performance
advantages over the New Keynesian Phillips curve not only when subjected to econometric
testing, but also when combined with theories of political cycles [see Brevik and Gärtner
(2005)]
4. Current developments
Current research on monetary policy and central banks is looking for answers to three
important questions:
1. How can the stabilization options be improved? Rather than discussing how
different parameters and targets within a given family of assigned utility functions can be
optimized so as to achieve a second best solution on an existing trade off, researchers turn
to completely different target variables and how these may affect the trade off options
themselves. We will exemplify this by comparing inflation targets as discussed above to price
level targets.
2. Is the consolidated knowledge as surveyed in section 3 reasonably robust to
changes in the macroeconomic environment within which monetary policy operates? A key
role in this discussion is being played by the so called New Keynesian aggregate supply curve
which, in line with recent methodological changes in macroeconomics, is being derived from
solid microfoundations and features forward looking inflation expectations.
20
3. How can some of the more abstract theoretical insights of political macroeconomics
be brought to bear on the actual conduct of monetary policy. This question is being discussed
in a separate strand of research focussing on policy rules, which has close ties to the topics
discussed so far.
4.1. The choice of targets and their effects on trade-offs
The question which macroeconomic variable monetary policy should target is not a trivial
one.  To  demonstrate  how  the  choice  of  target  variables  affects  the  variability  of
macroeconomic variables, as well as the implied trade offs between these variabilities, let us
compare inflation targets with price level targets. In order to focus on the issue at hand,
assume, as much of the literature does, that society can assign a target to the central bank in
the strict sense that the target overrides any pertinent preferences the central bank itself may
have  (rather  than  adding  it  to  the  central  bank‘s  preferences,  as  assumed  previously).
Equipped with such an assigned inflation target, the central bank utility function reads  17  
(19) u ' & 0.5(π& πT)2 & 0.5ˆ ξ(y & k)2
The discretionary optima for inflation and income that follow are





(21) y ' 1
1% ˆ ξ
g
The volatility trade off from which society may choose by selecting   is characterized ˆ ξ
by   and  , and depicted as the lower convex line var(π) ' [ˆ ξ/(1%ˆ ξ)]2σ
2
g var(y) ' [1/(1%ˆ ξ)]2σ
2
g
in Figure 2. The specific target value   neither affects the trade off, nor where we end up πT
on it. But the inflation target can be used to reduce or eliminate the inflation bias. Since this
is independent of the stabilization of shocks, there is no more trade off between the inflation
bias and the stabilization bias. This makes the entire curve an efficiency frontier, a locus of
Pareto optimal outcomes. As long as monetary policy is governed by preferences coming
from this very family of utility functions, comprising inflation and income as arguments that
enter in quadratic form, we end up somewhere on this line. All society can do is move up or
down  this  curve  into  its  preferred  point  by  picking  ,  trading  lower  volatility  of  one ˆ ξ
macroeconomic variable for higher volatility of the other.
Now  other  families  of  utility  functions  exist,  comprising  different  variables  or
functional forms, that could be assigned to the central bank. An argument that is often
advanced against in inflation targets for monetary policy is that they make the variance of the
price level go towards infinity as we increase the time horizon, making it difficult for
individuals and firms to form expectations. In an attempt to remedy this, the government may
assign a price level target to the central bank instead, even though society‘s preferences are
still as given in equation (3) with α = 0. The central bank‘s assigned utility function then
reads
(22) u ' & 0.5(p& p T)2 & 0.5ˆ ξ(y & k)2  18  
where p is the logarithm of the price level. Note that the aggregate supply function (4) may
be rewritten as
(23) y ' p & E&1p % g
since inflation is the first difference in the log of the price level. Maximizing (22) subject to
(23) mimics the maximization of (19) subject to (4), except that the price level p has taken
the place of inflation π. Hence the solution for the price level is equal to the solution we
previously derived for inflation,




Whether we assign an inflation target or a price level target has no effect on income which
again follows
(25) y ' 1
1% ˆ ξ
g
Since  , the behaviour of inflation is directly derived from (24): π / p&p&1




This implies an inflation variance of  , which is twice as large as when var(π) ' 2[ˆ ξ/(1%ˆ ξ)]2σ
2
g
the central bank pursued an inflation target. As Figure 2 illustrates, this dramatically worsens
the options for stabilization policy and is likely to affect society‘s pick of central bank
conservativeness.  In  fact,  a  second best  optimum  cannot  even  be  achieved  because
  –  which  would  provide  the  right  inflation  variability  –  and [ξ/(1%ξ)]2 ' 2[ˆ ξ/(1%ˆ ξ)]2
 – which would provide the desired variability of income – cannot be 1/(1%ξ) ' [1/(1%ˆ ξ)]
met at the same time. Independently of society‘s preferences, which we may not know, we
can state that assigning a price level target is inefficient. Switching from a price level to an
inflation target permits lowering the variance of inflation (income) without raising the  19  
21 Note that the trade off between inflation and income variability reflects both the
utility  function  governing  monetary  policy  and  the  structural  equations  describing  the
macroeconomy. Thus the relative efficiency of inflation targeting demonstrated here only
holds for the macroeconomy reduced to the particular aggregate supply employed here. Ball
(1999) demonstrates the efficiency of inflation targets in a backward looking two equations
model that includes a dynamic IS curve.  Williams (2003) uses the Federal Reserve Board‘s
large scale FRB/US macroeconometric model  to argue in favour of simple rules that include
inflation targets. Using a behavioural model featuring sticky information, however, Ball,
Mankiw and Reis (2003) argue that flexible price level targeting could outperform inflation
targets.
Figure 2
variance of income (inflation).
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The example used here goes to show that the choice of a target variable, or of the
proper set of target variables, is a delicate one with obvious welfare implications. The
inefficiency of price level targeting relative to inflation targeting is not robust, however, to
changes in the macroeconomic framework. This is not really surprising, since the trade off
is generated by the complete model, comprising both the macroeconomic structure and the
incentives governing monetary policy. Ball (1999) demonstrates that  inflation targets are also
efficient in a backward looking two equations model that includes a dynamic IS curve.
Williams (2003) uses the Federal Reserve Board‘s large scale FRB/US macroeconometric  20  
22 For a detailed discussion of this and related New Keynesian aggregate supply
curves and their implications for monetary policy see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).
23 Incidentally, a vote maximizing government facing a backward looking electorate
and a New Keynesian aggregate supply curve with β = 0 would create a political business
cycle with some of the same features as the Nordhaus cycle. In fact, in a two period setting
it  would  be  the  very  same  cycle  that  a  government  creates  when  aggregate  supply  is
neoclassical and inflation expectations are of the simplest adaptive mould ( ). E&1π ' π&1
model  to argue in favour of simple rules that include inflation targets. However, using a
behavioural model featuring sticky information, Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005) argue that
flexible  price  level  targeting  could  outperform  inflation  targets.  Svensson  (1999b)
demonstrates  that,  when  faced  with  an  economy  with  a  sufficient  degree  of  income
persistence, society may be well advised to assign price level targeting even though it
possesses preferences cast in terms of an optimal inflation rate, because it results in lower
inflation variability. Dittmar and Gavin (2000) show that in a model with a New Keynesian
Phillips curve, as discussed in the following section, price level targeting always generates
a more favourable tradeoff between income and inflation variability, even if income is not
persistent.
4.2. The New Keynesian aggregate-supply or Phillips curve
Roberts (1995) uses the Calvo (1983) model (in which prices are sticky because during any
given period a firm has a fixed probability, strictly smaller than 1, that it may adjust prices)
to show that a loglinear approximation about the steady state of the aggregated pricing
decisions of individual firms reads
(27) y ' βy&1% π & Eπ%1 % g
While this aggregate supply curve looks very similar to the neoclassical supply curve with
persistence that we used above, the inclusion of tomorrows expected rate of inflation rather
than today‘s has important implications. 
22 One is that any movement in inflation, even when
it is rationally anticipated, affects income.
23 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) look at how this
bears on the issues discussed in the preceding sections of this paper. Major findings are:
1. There is an inflation bias if the central bank has an income target that exceeds
potential income. This is most easily rationalized if we think of monetary policy as a series  21  
of one shot games in which policymakers take next period‘s expected inflation as given. It
also holds in a more general setting, however, when the central bank has a longer horizon.
2. The inflation bias is negatively correlated with central bank conservativeness, that
is, with the weight that the income target has in its utility function. An ‚inflation nutter‘
( ), as an arch conservative central bank is sometimes referred to, would entirely ˆ ξ ' 0
eliminate the inflation bias.
3. As a final analogue to results obtained within the neoclassical framework, only a
moderately conservative central bank would strike the right balance between the desires to
reduce the inflation bias and to keep shock stabilization as undistorted as possible.
The framework used by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), being somewhat richer than
the one reported here, with shocks on the supply side and on the demand side, permits a host
of other insights not directly comparable to the consolidated knowledge acquired within the
neoclassical framework. A key issue that has been raised within this context, however, is
whether preferences do indeed feature an income target which exceeds potential income, thus
generating a problem of time inconsistency  This is an important question, because if there
was no inflation bias, or if it had different causes than presumed since the time inconsistency
dilemma was spelled out by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), the
dilemma of choosing between inflation bias reduction and  less distortion of stabilization
policy might not exist, making things much simpler for monetary policy.
As Cukierman (2002) has demonstrated, though, an income target exceeding normal
or potential income is not necessary for an inflation bias to occur. All that is needed is an
asymmetry in the central bank‘s utility function. Suppose preferences are such that the central
bank wants income to rise, but only until it reaches potential income. It does not want push
it beyond that level, but, if it exceeds potential income due to a favourable supply shock, it
refrains from trying to drive it down. As a consequence, whenever a positive shock hits and
income is above potential income, inflation remains at zero. Whenever a negative shock
drives income below normal levels, monetary policy cushions that fall by creating inflation.
As a result, average and expected inflation are strictly greater than zero. We end up with an
inflation  bias  in  equilibrium.  In  this  context,  much  of  the  same  remedies  and  policy
recommendations would apply that we derived above, with the math being more cumbersome
due to the employed piecewise utility functions.  22  
24  We follow Svensson (1999), who is one of the most active contributors to this
discussion.
25 There has been a host of conferences with „monetary policy rules“ in the title,
sponsored or hosted by central banks. A first example is the conference jointly sponsored by
the Sveriges Riksbank and the Institute for International Economic Studies at Stockholm
University, held June 12 13, 1998, in Stockholm. A more recent example is the conference
on "Fiscal and Monetary Policy" held at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on March
4.3. The quest for monetary policy rules
This is probably the most active topic on today‘s research agenda on monetary policy. The
field is still in a flux, and there are several perspectives from which to look at it. In order to
understand the current discussion, we need to introduce some definitions.
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From a simplifying perspective there are two kinds of monetary policy rules. The first
category comprises instrument rules. These specify how some instrument of monetary policy,
typically  an  interest  rate  or  monetary  aggregate,  responds  to  a  set  of  macroeconomic
variables. If these variables are predetermined at the time the instrument is being set, we
speak of an explicit instrument rule. An implicit instrument rule specifies the instrument as
a function of forward looking variables that are not predetermined, of course. Due to this
simultaneity between instrument and determining variables, this must be considered an
equilibrium condition rather than a rule.
The second group of monetary policy rules comprises targeting rules. Characteristic
for a targeting rule is the „assignment“ of a loss function to the central bank. We have already
encountered this in section 4.1. If the assigned loss function features only one target variable,
say inflation, we are dealing with a strict targeting rule. If additional variables are included,
say income, we speak of a flexible targeting rule. To the extent that the right or best target
variables are difficult to control or to observe, the use of loss functions with intermediate
targets is sometimes proposed. These targets should be highly correlated with the true goal,
but easier to control and to observe.
Current research on monetary policy rules is related to the work reported in section
3. But it also differs in a few major aspects:
1. There is a deliberate shift from a predominantly analytical towards a sophisticated
yet practical monetary policy analysis, with strong doses of pragmatism and a quest for
quantitative results. As a consequence, research interests of academics and central banks have
begun to meet in this area.
25  23  
4 5, 2005.
26 Among those who have criticized the premise of central banks pursuing income
targets which exceed potential income from the background of their hands on experience with
monetary policy making is Blinder (1995). Academic criticism of this idea has come, among
others, from McCallum (1995, 1997) and Taylor (1983).
2. Employed models have been stripped of time inconsistency. So there is no more
inflation bias and no more potential for conflict between price stability and stabilization
policy.  Stabilizing  inflation  and  income  around  their  desired  values  remains  the  only
challenge. The discarding of the inflation bias appears to come as a response to criticism by
a group of central bank notables and academics that the underlying story [Barro and Gordon
(1983)] was unconvincing and empirically inaccurate. As a result, models are being employed
in which a loss function or rule is imposed on the central bank that features an income target
coinciding with potential income.
26
3. While the New Classical or Lucas aggregate supply curve, more recently with
added persistence, had completely dominated the literature discussed in section 3, there is no
such consensus in the rules discussion. By contrast, this discussion accepts that no consensus
regarding the right model of the macroeconomy has emerged yet, and emphasizes that this
calls for thorough checks as to whether any derived rules are robust in the sense that they still
function reasonably well even within alternative macroeconomic models. These models cover
a wide range of possibilities. Some reduce to a single equation. Some comprise up to a
hundred  equations.  Some  are  derived  from  intertemporal  optimizing  behaviour  of
representative agents. Some are made up of equations purported to mimic the dynamic
relationships we see in empirical VARs. In some the short run non neutrality of money
results from sticky prices. In others the cause is sticky information.
4. A final innovation characteristic of the discussion of monetary policy rules is the
use of analytical and empirical methods that have become standard in real business cycle and
dynamic general equilibrium analyses. This includes the calibration of models, stochastic
simulations, and judgement of the empirical validity by means of comparing variances,
covariances and other moments between simulated time series and those encountered in
reality.  24  
27 For an account of how the Friedman rule fared in practice, see Hafer and Wheelock
(2001).
28 See, for example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), who estimate policy reaction
functions for the G3 (Germany, Japan, and the US) and the E3 (UK, France, and Italy)
4.3.1. The Taylor rule and other instrument rules
Instrument rules for monetary and fiscal policy have a long tradition in economics. In the
past, the most famous such rule was the Friedman rule, proposing that the money supply
should grow at a fairly constant rate equal to the trend growth rate of income. Such a rule is
an explicit, if not an exogenous rule, since it hardly allows for any feedback from current
economic variables into monetary policy, certainly not in the short run.
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Among the recent crop of more sophisticated monetary policy rules, which includes
McCallum‘s (1988)  rule for the monetary base, the Henderson and McKibbin (1993) rule for
the federal funds rate, and dozens of other rules, the rule that has swept the field is the one
proposed by Taylor (1993). The Taylor rule states that the central bank has a real interest rate
target, from which it deviates if inflation and/or income are off target. Solving this for the
nominal interest rate yields
(28) i ' r T % π % 0.5(π& πT) % 0.5( y& y()
When following the Taylor rule, the central bank sets its instrument, the federal funds
rate, at r
T when inflation and income are at their optimal levels. An increase in inflation
makes the central bank raise the nominal interest rate by a factor of 1.5. This raises the real
interest rate, thus dampening aggregate demand. While it does not include any forward 
looking variables, the Taylor rule can nevertheless call for preemptive strikes against future
inflation. This is the case if rising income, which also drives up the real interest rate, drives
up inflation with a lag.
Initially proposed as a descriptive and expository devise that can be used to account
for the general flavour of monetary policy in the US and explain the Fed‘s policy shift during
the  Volcker  era,  the  Taylor  rule  has  become  much  more.  An  in  the  meanwhile  quite
voluminous amount of empirical research suggests that Taylor‘s rule is indeed a quite
reasonable description of policy behaviour of many central banks, including the Bundesbank,
which is usually considered the most extreme ‚inflation nutter‘ in recent history.
28 The rule  25  
countries, and Peersman and Smets (1998), who explore the Taylor rule as a benchmark for
analysing monetary policy in the euro area.
29 It is generally believed that quite a number of central banks, including those of
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the U.K. have adopted some form of inflation
targeting during the last ten to fifteen years.
30 Strict inflation targeting could nevertheless be efficient. But since, in terms of figure
2, it puts the economy to where the efficiency frontier meets the ordinate, it would only be
optimal for societies with extreme preferences.
also has come to fame in financial circles, where it is now a common tool for forecasting
changes in the interest rate.
4.3.2. Inflation targeting and other targeting rules
As mentioned, a targeting rule is characterized by the assignment of a loss or utility function
to the central bank. In section 3 we showed this in a parsimonious framework for inflation
and income. Many possible targets are being discussed in the literature, such as the price 
level, inflation, nominal GDP or nominal GDP growth, with inflation targeting drawing the
most academic interest and being the most successful among central banks.
29 The term
inflation targeting is a misnomer, however, because only strict inflation targeting refers to a
utility function of the form  .
30 If additional target variables enter the utility u ' &0.5(π& πT)2
function, this is being referred to as flexible inflation targeting. An example is the familiar
utility function
(29) u ' & 0.5(π& πT)2 & 0.5ξ(y & y()2
In an effort to facilitate practical implementation or monitoring, a target rule is often
expressed as a set of equations the target variables must fulfill. In the case of equation (29),
if there is perfect control over the target variables and there is no trade off, we obtain these
equations from the first order conditions for the unrestricted maximum of the utility function
as   and  . If control is imperfect, the expected values must equal the targets. π ' πT y ' y(
Things do become much more complicated, however, when, as is always the case, we have
trade offs between macroeconomic variables, be it within periods or intertemporarily. While
first order conditions usually still exist, they may be too complicated for practical purposes.
It may then be advisable to switch to intermediate target variables which, ideally, should be  26  
31 The Taylor rule maximizes a utility function such as (29) only then as a strict
instrument rule, if sufficient lags make inflation and income predetermined when the interest
rate  is  being  set.  A  pragmatic  macroeconomic  structure,  purported  to  parsimoniously
represent results from typical VARs that interest rates affect income after one year and
inflation after two years, that serves this purpose comprises a dynamic IS curve,
y ' &βr&1 % γy&1 % g
and an accelerationist aggregate supply curve (without expectations),
π ' π&1 % δy&1 % η
where all variables are measured as deviations from their targets. Minimization of the loss
function var(π) + ξ var(y), which directly relates to (29), yields an explicit interest rate rule:
r ' ˆ απ % ˆ βy
where the coefficients depend on the model‘s structural coefficients. See Ball (1999), who
discusses a calibrated version of this model and efficiency regions for numerical parameters.
„highly correlated with the goal, easier to control than the goal, easier to observe than the
goal, and transparent“ [Svensson (1999a), p. 619]. In terms of how to pursue the target,
Svensson (1999a) further reports that the target variable included in the loss function is
usually not the best indicator for the instrument to respond to.
4.3.3. Comparing instrument and targeting rules
From a purely technical viewpoint, instrument and targeting rules are simply two sides of the
same coin. Maximization of any utility function or target subject to a macroeconomic model
leads to an optimal instrument rule. For example, maximization of (29) with respect to the
instrument π, subject to (4), gives the instrument rule  . This is impractical π ' πT & gξ/(1%ξ)
for  monitoring  and  practical  implementation,  however,  since  it  makes  the  instrument
dependent on an unobservable shock. Fortunately, this rule may be rewritten. After solving
(4) for g and substituting the result, we obtain
(30) π ' πT & ξ(E&1π& πT) & ξ( y& y()
The result is a Taylor like instrument rule in which the instrument π depends on observable
or computable variables: the income gap and the expected deviation of inflation from the
inflation  target.  We  may  note  here  that  (28)  is  not  an  explicit  instrument  rule.  The
endogeneity of income on the right hand side makes this rule implicit, an equilibrium
condition.
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Just as the optimization of a given utility or loss function generates an explicit or  27  
32 See the conference volume edited by Taylor (1999), which focusses on the issue of
how robust various policy rules perform in a variety of different macroeconomic frameworks.
implicit instrument rule, any given instrument rule can be traced back to a utility function that
is being optimized. This mapping from preferences to instrument rule or back does, of course,
crucially depend on the macroeconomic model to which it is attached, and it may not be
unique.
The competition between instrument and target rules thus boils down to the question
of which one is more practical. At the start of this discussion we must note that realistic
models of the macroeconomy, in particular the macroeconometric models typically used in
applied monetary policy research, are much more complex than the models we looked at so
far. While this need not affect the utility function to be assigned to the central bank, it leads
to  immensely  complicated  optimal  instrument  rules,  which  would  be  very  difficult  to
monitor. On the other hand, it will also bear heavily on how a central bank pursues its
assigned targets. It is flexible in doing so, however, and free to incorporate any progress the
science of macroeconomics may make. As our view of how the economy functions changes,
the target(s) need not be adjusted. An instrument rule, by contrast, would have to be adjusted
continuously, which may lead into credibility problems and, in the face of the mentioned
monitoring problems, make room for an inflation bias. But this is where the conceded
uncertainty or disagreement over what constitutes a realistic or the true macroeconomic
model comes into play.
4.3.4. Simplicity and efficiency
Robustness studies of instrument rules have produced a number of interesting results:
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First, complex, optimal instrument rules derived from one specific model perform
poorly when plugged into some other different model with a different structure. So using such
a rule would be very risky if we have serious doubts about the true nature of macroeconomic
transmission channels and interaction.
Second, simple instrument rules, taken from the same family as the Taylor rule,
usually do not perform much worse than the complex optimal rule.
Third, and this is actually implied in the second result, the near optimal performance  28  
33 A study that makes these points in a convincing fashion is Williams (2003), with
the caveat that the nature of expectations formation crucially affects the efficiency and
robustness of simple rules.
of simple rules is rather robust across a wide spectrum of different models.
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In the light of these results, applied monetary policy research has very much ceased
to look for optimal rules. The reason already hinted at is that the simplicity of optimal rules
that we had encountered in this surveys abstract theoretical discussions with highly stylized
macroeconomic models is deceptive, and does not carry over to analyses with a more realistic
macroeconomy derived from econometric work. Instead, simple rules are being studied. Both
with regard to how they perform within different macroeconomic models relative to the
respective optimal rules, and with respect to how they fare under different social preferences.
The latter question has triggered a discussion of the efficiency of monetary policy rules.
Ball (1999) addresses the issue of preference uncertainty (and, thus, of rule efficiency),
with uncertainty referring to ξ, the relative weight of income stabilization in society‘s utility
function. In terms of Figure 2 this means that we do not know the slope of society‘s
indifference curves. Then the location of the true tangency point we would like to aim at is
not known, and the best we can do is focus on efficiency and identify those simple rules or
(set of) targeting variables that generate lower, more favourable trade off lines. These would
make sure that society can always be made better off, no matter what the true weight
parameter is in its utility function. In the context of a Lucas supply curve, Figure 2 shows that
inflation targeting is efficient when compared to price level targeting. Employing a different
model, which is a calibrated version of the macroeconomic model shown in footnote 31, Ball
compared inflation targeting, nominal GDP growth targeting, and the Taylor rule. In this
framework inflation targeting is efficient and nominal GDP growth targeting is inefficient.
The verdict for the Taylor rule is mixed. In its original form reported as equation (28), i.e.
endowed with the coefficients  of 0.5 advocated by Taylor, the rule is inefficient. In order to
render a rule efficient that has the same structure as the Taylor rule, the interest rate response
to output gaps would have to be about twice as high.
5. Assessment and outlook
Monetary policy is an exciting field to work in these days, both for its intellectual and
methodological challenges and in particular for its close interaction with policy makers and  29  
Figure 3
institutions.  From  a  public  choice  perspective,  nevertheless,  and  despite  the  enormous
progress that is being achieved, recent developments may cause mixed feelings. In a way one
may wonder whether, on an undisputedly higher level of theoretical and methodological
sophistication reflecting advances in statistical methods, solution algorithms, computer
power, and the microfoundations of macroeconomic models, we are not coming back full
circle to fostering and refining the seemingly extinct art of optimal economic policy making
as envisaged by the generation of Tinbergen and Theil. The resurgence of a more technocratic
approach with the return of the altruistic social planner becomes obvious when we interpret
recent developments against the political macroeconomics approach that was dominating the
discussion until a little more than a decade ago and that we traced in the first half of this
survey. It‘s main structure is sketched in Figure 3.
The political macroeconomics approach has three building blocks: the preferences of
society  (or  voters),  the  preferences  of  the  policymaker  (here  the  central  bank),  and  a
macroeconomic model (usually degenerated into an aggregate supply equation). Monetary
policy conducted within the stochastic macroeconomic model generates economic outcomes.
These are then evaluated by society on the basis of its preferences. The key result is that
monetary policy governed by society‘s preferences produces a suboptimal outcome featuring
an undesired, high level of price instability. Society can improve on this suboptimal outcome
in a number of ways. One way to achieve price stability without distorting the stabilization  30  
34 For further arguments on the pros and cons of an income target in excess of
potential income, see Walsh (2003), p. 370ff.
of shocks is to set new incentives for the central bank by picking a progressive central bank
which cares a lot about income, making it independent of the government, and adding an
inflation target to its environment.
The current applied discussion of rules and targets for monetary policy questions all
three building blocks that characterize the public choice approach:
1. Society (and, thus, also the central bank chief we can pick from the population) has
no more desire for income to exceed potential income. So preferences are compatible with
what can actually be achieved in the long run, both regarding price stability and the level of
income. This eliminates the inflation bias, and, hence, the dilemma of a potential trade off
between an inflation and a stabilization bias. In fact, monetary policy governed by society‘s
preferences generates an optimal long run equilibrium and stabilization as desired. 
2. The central bank has no preferences of its own. It can either be „assigned“ a loss
function (as for instance in the inflation targeting approach), or a monetary policy rule.
3. Finally, and this is one of the strong points, current research about rules and targets
accepts as a fact that economists do not agree on a correct macroeconomic model.
On the issue of whether there is a basis for time inconsistency and excessive inflation,
it is hard to see why society should settle for potential income as its optimal choice. If
potential income is indeed the result of a series of distortions, as is argued for most industrial
countries, and comes along with such burdens as involuntary unemployment, shouldn‘t we
want higher income. Do Europeans really not want their 10 percent a priori risk of being
unemployed to fall? This is, in effect what we are claiming when we argue that the desire for
income not to exceed potential income is in our preferences. It is something entirely different
if we decide that we do not want to draw on monetary policy to raise income. This would be
the result of a cost benefit calculation on the basis of the macroeconomic options, from which
we might conclude that a short lived income hike was not worth the price of a lasting increase
in inflation. Our preferences are an element in this calculation, but must not be confused with
the calculation itself.
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Discarding the central bank‘s generic preferences and assuming it can simply be
assigned any utility function or instrument rule is similarly worrisome. This might be a
plausible approximation when fines for deviations from the assigned instrument or targeting  31  
35 For an example of monetary and fiscal policy interaction, see Demertzis, Hughes
Hallet and Viegi (2004), and for a survey and detailed discussion of how trade unions and the
labour market in general affect monetary policy conduct and institutional choice, see Berger,
de Haan and Eijffinger (2001).
rules are so large that personal preferences are dwarfed. But this does not really seem to and
cannot really be the idea in a world of change in which rules can at best be a frame of
reference for policy decisions. Non of these rules tells us how to adjust target levels in an
evolving macroeconomic environment, how to implement a rule or switch from one to
another, how to respond to financial bubbles or other phenomena outside our standard
models.
So, measured against what political macroeconomics achieved and contributed to
monetary  policy  making  and  design,  current  developments  may  be  seen  as  a  setback.
Devising optimal rules and targets is certainly useful, but so are plans of how to eat right. The
problem is that even its proponents see and sell monetary policy rules as a general framework
with plenty of discretion. But then, what is the value of optimality and robustness studies that
are based on the strict application of a particular rule, if we do not know under what
circumstances, how often, and in what direction central banks will deviate from or even
change the rule? And shouldn‘t a comprehensive analysis include other policy instruments
and  institutions,  such  as  fiscal  policy  and  labour  unions,  and  how  their  responses  or
preemptive actions bear on the optimality or efficiency of monetary policy targets and rules?
35
Such questions obviously cannot be addressed without reactivating the public choice element
in monetary policy research.  32  
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